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Alex Mashinsky won't get to exploit the same ambiguity. The Vermont filing, as the kids put it, has got receipts.
It again and again notes specific dates on which Mashinsky made public attestations to the firm's financial health, at the precise moment Celsius was actually deeply in the red. Those deceptions may well form the foundation of a criminal fraud case against the CEO and his allies.
The Vermont filing also explores the role of the CEL token in Celsius' finances. "If Celsius' net position in CEL is excluded, its liabilities exceed its assets in all of the Freeze Reports and Preliminary Balance Sheets provided to state regulators," the filing claims, referencing reports beginning May 2021. Even more broadly, the filing claims that "excluding the Company's net position in CEL, liabilities would have exceeded its assets since at least Feb. 28, 2019."
In other words, Celsius was effectively insolvent nearly from birth. The only way it avoided acknowledging that was by tallying the value of its self-generated "Monopoly" money.
And if that wasn't enough, the Vermont filing further cites "credible claims [that] Celsius and its management engaged in the improper manipulation of the price of the CEL token." It claims that Celsius spent hundreds of millions of dollars worth of depositor funds buying CEL tokens, with the possible intent of pumping the token price – including after Celsius halted user withdrawals on June 12.
Regardless of what any court concludes, that sure sounds like criminal behavior. It's also a major question for regulators going forward – should centralized private companies be free to issue their own blockchain tokens at all? And if they can, how should they be required or allowed to account for those tokens financially?
Celsius, certainly, makes the case that printing your own money shouldn't be treated as a legitimate path to corporate profit.
– David Z. Morris
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